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Recent Decisions
CIVIL RIGHTS - REMEDIES -A SINGLE DISTRICT CONSTITU-
TIONAL VIOLATION MAY, IN LIMITED CIRCUMSTANCES, BE REMEDIED
By THE GRANT OF INTERDISTRICT RELIEF - Hills v. Gautreaux.1
In 1971 the United States Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment (HUD) was judicially determined2 to have violated the fifth
amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.3 HUD had knowingly
sanctioned and funded the Chicago Housing Authority's (CHA) admin-
istration of a segregated public housing system. The issue before the
Supreme Court in Hills v. Gautreaux was whether a United States District
Court possessed the power to remedy these violations by ordering HUD to
undertake corrective action outside the Chicago city limits. The Court
held, without dissent, that such a "metropolitan area remedy" was not
impermissible as a matter of law.4 In granting relief of this nature, a
court need only insure that its decree does not "impermissibly interfere"
with local governmental units that were not implicated in the constitutional
violation. 5
The Gautreaux litigation began in 1966 with the filing of two class action
suits, one against CHA and one against HUD, in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Illinois. In the first action, six
plaintiffs6 alleged that during the period 1950 to 1965, CHA had pur-
posely avoided the placement of public housing projects in white residential
areas7 and had deliberately established racial quotas to minimize black
tenancy levels in those few projects located in white neighborhoods. 8 In
the second suit, which was brought against HUD, the same plaintiffs
claimed that HUD, by approving and funding CHA's segregated housing
projects, had thereby assisted in the establishment and perpetuation of a
racially discriminatory public housing system.9
1. 96 S. Ct. 1538 (1976).
2. Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971).
3. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970) provides that:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assist-
ance.
4. 96 S. Ct. at 1550.
5. Id. at 1546.
6. The plaintiffs were all black and either tenants in or applicants for public
housing in the City of Chicago.





The plaintiffs won the CHA suit in district court on a motion for
summary judgment, the court finding that CHA had indeed done what was
alleged.10 Nevertheless, the court, which had meanwhile held the HUD
action in abeyance, subsequently granted HUD's motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim on which relief could be
granted. The plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit, which reversed and directed the district court to
enter summary judgment against HUD.12 On remand, the parties13 pre-
sented various remedial options to the trial court. The court rejected the
plaintiffs' request for metropolitan relief, ruling that such a remedy was
inappropriate because there were no allegations that "CHA and HUD dis-
criminated or fostered racial discrimination in the suburbs"' 4 and because
the evidence disclosed only intracity violations. Instead, the court adopted
10. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969). In
granting summary judgment the district court focused on two CHA violations.
First, tenant assignment procedures used by CHA had, in essence, "imposed a Negro
quota" at four CHA projects built in substantially all-white areas and thus were
discriminatory. Id. at 909. Secondly, the court found that the procedure used to select
new public housing sites (whereby Chicago City Council Aldermen were given an
informal veto over sites selected in their wards) was discriminatory as well. The
court noted that "no criterion, other than race, can plausibly explain the veto of
over 9911% of the housing units located on the white sites . . . and at the same time
the rejection of only 10% or so of the units on Negro sites." Id. at 912.
For a further discussion of the district court decision, see Hills v. Gautreaux,
96 S. Ct. 1538, 1542 n.8 (1976) ; Note, Gautreaux v. City of Chicago: Implementation
of Desegregation Orders in Public Housing, 8 URBAN L. ANN. 265 (1974).
11. Hills v. Gautreaux, 96 S. Ct. 1538, 1542 (1976). Count I of the plaintiff's
complaint alleged a violation of the due process clause of the fifth amendment to the
United States Constitution. The district court held that there was lack of jurisdiction
as to Count I because the circumstances were such that "the Fifth Amendment ...
[would] not authorize this suit." Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731, 733 (1971).
Count II, which alleged that HUD violated 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (section 601 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964), was dismissed because "HUD's financial assistance to
CHA was insufficient to make it a 'joint participant' in CHA's racially discriminatory
conduct." 448 F.2d at 733.
12. Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971). The court of appeals
ruled that general federal question jurisdiction was available under 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1970). In addition, the court rejected the Government's argument, raised for the
first time on appeal, that the HUD controversy was moot because relief involving
HUD had already been granted through the district court's order against CHA.
448 F.2d at 735. Finally, the court found that HUD's actions, though performed in
a good faith effort to increase the supply of housing in Chicago, were both significant
and "exercised . . .in a manner which perpetuated a racially discriminatory housing
system in Chicago." Id. at 739. Since there were no disputed issues of fact, the
appellate court was able to rule that HUD had violated the due process clause of the
fifth amendment and section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
13. The parties now included both HUD and CHA, as the trial court, on remand,
had granted the plaintiff's motion to consolidate the HUD and CHA cases. 96
S. Ct. at 1542-43.
14. Gautreaux v. Romney, 363 F. Supp. 690, 691 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
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HUD's plan, which confined all corrective activities within the Chicago
city limits.15
The plaintiffs appealed this ruling as to the appropriate remedy to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. This appeal
raised the problem of defining the nature and limits of a federal court's
power to fashion equitable remedies for constitutional violations.'" In
15. Under the HUD plan, the Department promised to use its "best efforts" to
increase the number of low-income dwelling units in Chicago and not to approve or
fund any further CHA programs that were discriminatory. Id. at 691.
16. From almost the inception of the federal court system, there has been a
controversy over whether the article III judicial power of the courts can be exercised
so as to interfere with the operation of state governments. A statute enacted in 1793
prohibited the issuance of a writ of injunction "to stay proceedings in any court of a
state." Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 334-35. This prohibition was
carried forward in 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970), which was revised in 1948 to provide
for three explicit exceptions to the operation of the ban. Construing a pre-1948
version of section 2283 in Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118 (1941),
Justice Frankfurter suggested that the original 1793 provision "reflected the prevailing
prejudices against equity jurisdiction," and observed that the act expressed "the
desire of Congress to avoid friction between the federal government and the states
resulting from the intrusion of federal authority into the orderly functioning of a
state's judicial process." Id. at 131, 135. Accord Atlantic Coast Line R.. v. Brother-
hood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 285-87 (1970). For a more extensive
discussion of the history and operation of the Anti-Injunction Act see C. WRIGHT, LAW
OF FEDERAL CouRTs 177-82 (2d ed. 1970).
Another aspect of this controversy involves the question whether a federal
court can exercise jurisdiction over an action by a citizen against a state government.
In Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), Justice Marshall ruled that a
citizen of one state could sue another state, though the state had not consented to
suit. This decision provoked an immediate uproar that led to the ratification of the
eleventh amendment, which provides that the judicial power does not extend to suits
against a state by the citizens of another state. The eleventh amendment has been
construed as an expression of general support for the principles of state sovereignty.
Its bar applies even though the state may not be the party of record, Governor of Ga.
v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. (1 Pet) 110, 122-23 (1828), and also when the suit is brought
by a state's own citizens. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). Although for much
of its history the eleventh amendment exerted only a negligible impact on federal
court litigation, it has recently exhibited new vitality. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651 (1974); Note, A Practical View of the Eleventh Amendment - Lower
Court Interpretations and the Supreme Court's Reaction, 61 GEo. L.J. 1473 (1973).
The coverage of the eleventh amendment does not extend, however, to municipalities.
Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890).
The landmark case of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), involved yet
another variation on the problem of conflicts between the federal judicial power and
state sovereignty. The issue was whether a federal court could enjoin a state attorney
general from enforcing a state rate statute that was alleged to violate the fourteenth
amendment. State litigation had not yet been commenced so the Anti-Injunction Act
did not apply. It was not clear, however, whether the eleventh amendment protected
a state official in this situation, and, if not, whether there was sufficient state action to
invoke the fourteenth amendment. The Court solved this dilemma by a fiction.
Because the official's enforcement of an illegal statute was unconstitutional, his
conduct could not be authorized by the state and hence the eleventh amendment did
not apply; yet because the official's conduct arose from a state statute, his conduct
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the past two decades, the school desegregation cases have dramatically
exposed the difficulty of precisely delineating the scope of this equitable
power. Although the Supreme Court discussed the issue in Brown v.
Board of Education (Brown II), 17 it merely stated that lower courts should
be guided by traditional equitable principles18 in their efforts to integrate
de jure segregated schools as mandated in Brown v. Board of Education
(Brown 1).19 In particular, the Court declared that there should be
"a practical flexibility in shaping ... remedies and ... a facility for ad-
justing and reconciling public and private needs."'20
Since there was no specific remedial plan under review in Brown II,
the Court discussed the scope of equitable relief solely in general terms. In
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,21 however, the Court
was confronted with a specific district court decree that ordered the
clustering of noncontiguous schools within the same district in order to
remedy the effects of prior de jure segregation in the school district. The
Court upheld the decree because such intradistrict relief was necessary in
order to execute Brown Is mandate that state-created dual school sys-
tems be dismantled. Although Swann did not involve a request for inter-
district relief, it articulated two guidelines that were to influence later
rulings on the permissibility of such relief. According to the Swann Court,
once a constitutional violation, such as de jure segregation, is established,
the district court must look to "the nature of the violation" to determine
the "scope of the remedy," 22 while at the same time making an attempt to
balance "individual and collective interests. '23 Swann did not elaborate
upon the interpretation or application of these two guidelines. Left un-
resolved were the relationship of the guidelines, the factors to be con-
sidered in applying them, and the selection of interests to be balanced.
The Supreme Court's next encounter with the problem of fashioning
equitable remedies for constitutional violations occurred in Milliken v.
Bradley,24 which involved a challenge to a decree that granted interdistrict
was state action for purposes of the fourteenth amendment. See C. WRIGHT, supra, at
184-85. Therefore, an injunction barring enforcement of the statute could be issued
against the state attorney general. The logic of Ex parte Young is unsatisfactory,
but it has persisted. That such fictions were necessary in order to justify a simple
injunction against an unconstitutional statute illustrates the difficulty in reconciling
federal equity power with federalism. This historical tension between the assertion
of broad remedial powers for the federal courts and notions of state sovereignty that
are the basis of federalism formed a backdrop to the formulation of equitable decrees
to effect desegregation after Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
17. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
18. Id. at 300.
19. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
20. Id. (footnotes omitted).
21. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
22. Id. at 16.
23. Id.
24. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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relief. In Milliken, the district court, upon finding de jure segregation
within the city of Detroit's school system, fashioned a remedial plan that
consolidated the city's schools with those of 53 outlying suburban districts.
The court concluded that consolidation was the only effective method
for desegregating the city's schools, 25 ruling that "district lines are simply
matters of political convenience and may not be used to deny constitutional
rights. '26 In reversing the interdistrict decree, Chief Justice Burger 21
shifted his emphasis away from the balancing approach suggested by Swann.
He announced that "the controlling principle consistently expounded in
our holdings is that the scope of the remedy is determined by the nature
and extent of the constitutional violation. ' 28 A multidistrict remedy would
be permissible only if it were found that the state or one or more of the
suburban school districts had committed a constitutional violation or
that a "significant segregative effect" could be identified in the suburban
area as a consequence of the Detroit violation.29 Such a remedy was im-
permissible under the facts of Milliken because neither a suburban violation
nor a segregative effect in that region had been demonstrated.8 0
Despite the emphasis on the "nature of the violation/scope of the
remedy" test, the language used by Chief Justice Burger in reaching his con-
clusion implied that a balancing of interests had also figured in the Court's
Milliken decision. In particular, the Chief Justice contrasted the "deeply-
rooted" tradition of "local control over the operation of schools"$' with
the need to "prescribe appropriate remedies. 832 Apparently, the concern
25. The district court stressed that even the optimal proposal for a remedy
confined to Detroit would "leave many of its schools 75 to 90 percent Black." 484
F.2d 215, 244 (6th Cir. 1973). Given the predominantly black composition of Detroit
schools prior to the order, such a remedy would do little to dissipate the segregative
effect
26. Id.
27. Chief Justice Burger also wrote the opinion in Swann.
28. 418 U.S. at 744.
29. Id. at 717, 744-45.
30. Justice Stewart filed a concurring opinion, contending that the only real issue
before the Court was the appropriate use of equity power by the federal courts. 418
U.S. at 753. To a greater extent than the majority, he stressed Swann's "nature of
the violation/scope of the remedy" guideline. Application of this guideline, said
Stewart, leads to the simple conclusion that the failure to prove a constitutional
violation outside of Detroit precludes relief extending beyond the city's boundaries.
Justice Stewart concluded by obserying that the court of appeals was in error solely
because it had gone beyond the limitations set down in Swann on the use of equitable
remedies.
For a further discussion of Milliken, see Kushner and Werner, Metropolitan
Desegregation After Milliken v. Bradley: The Case For Land Use Litigation Strate-
gies, 24 CATH. U.L. Rzv. 187 (1975); The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HAmv. L.
Rlv. 43, 61 (1974); Recent Developments, 3 HoFsmRA L. REv. 487 (1975); Recent
Cases, 43 U. CIN. L Rxv. 922 (1974); Recent Developments, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 135
(1975).
31. 418 U.S. 717, 741.
32. Id. at 744.
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over preserving local control over schools outweighed the competing con-
sideration, for Chief Justice Burger observed that "absent a complete
restructuring of the laws of Michigan relating to school districts the District
Court will become ... the 'school superintendent' for the entire area," a
situation that would "deprive the people of control of schools through their
elected representatives." 33
The Milliken decision was handed down during the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals' deliberations on the appropriate remedy for the HUD-
CHA violations in Chicago. After examining Milliken, the court of
appeals, in an opinion written by Justice Clark,3 4 concluded that it did
not bar metropolitan relief in housing cases.35 The court remanded the
case back to the district court for remedial action and HUD appealed.
The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Stewart, affirmed the
court of appeals decision. Nevertheless, the Court differed sharply with the
reasoning employed by the appellate court to reach that conclusion. Perhaps
the most crucial difference was the Supreme Court's reading of Milliken.
In a lengthy review of Milliken the Court sought to finally resolve any mis-
understandings about the meaning of that case. First, the Court noted that
the federal courts can issue equitable decrees that interfere with and re-
structure local and state governmental institutions only when a constitu-
tional violation has occurred.3 6 Then, reaffirming the test laid down by
33. Id. at 743-44.
34. Retired Associate Justice Tom C. Clark was sitting on the court of appeals
by designation.
35. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Auth., 503 F.2d 930, 936 (1974). The court
employed four distinct lines of reasoning to distinguish Milliken. First, contrasting
the long-standing tradition of local decision-making in school matters with the
"pervasive" statutory and supervisory involvement of the federal government in
public housing programs, the court reasoned that the "equitable factors" that precluded
metropolitan relief in Milliken were simply not present in this particular instance.
Id. Second, the court found that the administrative problems in ordering public
housing construction outside of Chicago were "not remotely comparable" with the
complex administrative difficulties of busing thousands of school children daily and
restructuring an entire metropolitan school system. Id. Third, the court speculated,
without ruling on the matter, that there was sufficient evidence in the record to satisfy
one or both prongs of the Milliken test for the imposition of an interdistrict remedy.
Id. Finally, the court noted that the parties had agreed that a remedial plan limited
to the City of Chicago would not be effective and that the metropolitan area constituted
the actual relevant market for low-cost public housing. Id. at 937.
In addition the court of appeals relied on the evidence submitted at the trial
level. One expert witness testified that every Chicago census tract would be thirty
percent black by the year 2000 unless "White flight" from the cities to the suburbs
was reduced. Id. at 938. The court of appeals considered the impact of this phenomenon
so important that metropolitan relief became both "necessary and equitable." Id.
at 936.
36. 96 S. Ct. 1538, 1544. The Court recently applied this principle in Rizzo v.
Goode, 96 S. Ct. 598, 607 (1976). Rizzo involved an allegation of unconstitutional
police conduct with respect to minority residents of Philadelphia. The Court, finding
no constitutional violation, overruled a Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmance of a
lower court decision to grant equitable relief.
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Chief Justice Burger in Milliken,3 7 the Court cautioned that this equitable
power can be exercised outside the district where the violation has taken
place only when there exists the "necessary predicate" 38 of either a
constitutional violation in the outlying districts or the identification of a
"significant segregative effect"3 9 in the outlying districts as a result of
violations in the core district. Justice Stewart rejected, however, the con-
tention that the Milliken decision was predicated upon "a balancing of
particular considerations presented by school desegregation cases."4 0 To
the contrary, he declared that Milliken advanced the principle that there
exist "fundamental limitations on the remedial powers of the federal courts
to restructure the operations of local and state governmental entities."'41
Adherence to this principle requires a court to "tailor 'the scope of the
remedy' to fit the 'nature and extent of the constitutional violation.' ",42
Applying these concepts, Justice Stewart proceeded to dismantle the
reasoning of the court of appeals decision. In particular, he claimed that
the bulk of Justice Clark's attempt to distinguish Milliken amounted to
nothing more than a "balanc[ing] of equitable factors"'43 in housing as
contrasted to school desegregation. The court of appeals had ignored the
essence of Milliken - that there are "basic limitations on the exercise of
the equity power of the federal courts. '44 The court of appeals also failed
to recognize that these limitations were not restricted to the context of
school desegregation cases, but were generally applicable.45 Justice Stewart
summarily dismissed the remainder of the court of appeals' analysis, con-
cluding that its reasoning was inaccurate. 46
The Court next considered HUD's interpretation of Milliken. Relying
on a two-part argument, HUD contended that Milliken barred metropolitan
relief in this case. First, HUD claimed that because its constitutional
violations occurred solely within the Chicago city limits, granting relief
involving other governmental units would violate Milliken's "nature of the
violation/scope of the remedy" test. The Court found this reasoning
37. 418 U.S. at 745.
38. 96 S. Ct. 1538, 1546.




43. 96 S. Ct. 1538, 1544-45 n.11.
44. Id. at 1544.
45. Id. at 1544-45.
46. The Court explicitly noted that the trial evidence showed neither an inter-
district violation nor a "significant segregative effect" Id. at 1544-45 n.11. Yet the
Court provided only minimal guidance as to what types of effects are indeed "signifi-
cant." It merely observed that the court of appeals, by "speculating" that such effects
were present, failed to demonstrate a level of impact that was "significant" Id.
The Supreme Court did not even discuss the court of appeal's fourth line of
reasoning, that the concessions of the parties regarding the actual relevant market
might alter the nature and scope of possible remedies.
19771
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unpersuasive. HUD, unlike the suburban school systems in Milliken, had
violated the Constitution. 47  Therefore, the "necessary predicate" that
could justify a remedial order against HUD existed. Milliken had limited
the circumstances in which an order might mandate relief in more than
one district, but it did not establish a "per se rule that federal courts lack
authority to order parties found to have violated the Constitution to under-
take remedial efforts beyond the municipal boundaries of the city where
the violation occurred. ' 48  In providing multidistrict relief to remedy a
single district violation, the only restriction upon a court is that it must
avoid interference with those government entities not implicated in the
constitutional violation.49
In the second half of its argument, HUD contended that metropolitan
relief would inevitably interfere with local governments in the Chicago area
that had not participated in the discrimination.5" After conducting a de-
tailed analysis of HUD's statutory authority, the Court concluded that a
trial court could frame a decree that would not "impermissibly interfere"
with surrounding local governments not implicated in HUD's constitu-
tional violation. This requirement of "non-interference" could be satisfied
through any of the administrative procedures used by HUD to increase
the nationwide availability of public housing. Using the local government
application system as an example,5 ' Justice Stewart noted that HUD
had formulated housing site approval rules designed to insure minority
group members the opportunity to obtain housing in nonintegrated areas,
even though municipal boundaries were crossed in the process. 52 There-
fore, a court-ordered remedial plan requiring HUD to "utilize its funding
and administrative powers in a manner consistent with" 58 the construction
of minority housing outside of Chicago need not coerce suburban govern-
47. Id. at 1546.
48. Id. A different ruling, said Stewart, would make Milliken not a "principled
limitation on the exercise of federal judicial authority" but an "arbitrary and mechani-
cal shield" to protect violators of the Constitution. Id. at 1547.
49. Id. at 1546.
50. It should be noted that because there was no specific remedial order yet in
existence, both the Court and HUD discussed the concept of metropolitan relief
solely in general terms. HUD advanced the theory, however, that "'court-ordered
metropolitan relief ... no matter how gently it's gone about, no matter how it's
framed, is bound to require HUD to ignore the safeguards of local autonomy and
local political processes.'" Id. at 1547.
51. Under this system, local governments apply to HUD for financial assistance
in constructing low-cost housing. Such applications are not mandatory and HUD has
no authority to unilaterally offer assistance without the approval of the locality. See
42 U.S.C. §§ 1415(7) (b), 1421b(a) (2) (1970).
52. These rules were first formulated in 1967 as part of HUD's effort to comply
with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Later, in 1972, HUD mandated the
use of in-house project selection criteria in an attempt to give priority to those
proposals offering housing outside of minority residential areas. See Maxwell, HUD's
Project Selection Criteria - A Cure for "Impermissible Color BlindnesS", 48 NoaR
DAME LAW. 92 (1972).
53. 96 S. Ct. at 1549.
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ments. Such a plan would merely force HUD to exercise its discretion
in a manner that avoids unconstitutional racial discrimination - a policy
that HUD had already espoused through its stated policy 54 of favoring
those local government applications that foster the goal of deconcentrating
minority housing opportunities.
The Court then noted that the Lower-Income Housing Assistance
program established by section 8 of the Housing and Community Develop-
ment Act of 197455 had largely displaced the older local government funding
scheme. 56 Under section 8, applications by local governments no longer
initiate federal involvement in providing low-cost public housing. Instead,
HUD can contract directly with private owners for the provision of low-
income leased housing at the local level.57 Localities may comment on
HUD's proposed assistance, reject HUD's funding of the project if it
conflicts with the locality's own approved housing plan, and require the
builders of low-income housing to adhere to local zoning and land-use
ordinances. 58 The Court reasoned that since local authorities retained
these various powers, section 8 did not impermissibly interfere with
suburban governments. Consequently, Justice Stewart concluded that a
remedial plan directing HUD "to provide the respondents with alternatives
to the racially segregated Chicago public housing system" would no more
coerce suburban municipalities than would "a discretionary decision by
HUD to use its statutory powers to provide" the same opportunity. 59
Thus a multidistrict remedy to cure a single district violation was not im-
permissible in this instance.60
Hills v. Gautreaux has resolved some of the major issues left open
in Milliken.61 In particular, the four justices composing the plurality in
Milliken have seemingly embraced the reasoning of Justice Stewart's
concurring Milliken opinion and agreed that the underlying basis for both
decisions is indeed the existence of fundamental limitations on the use of
federal equity power to remedy constitutional violations. Hills has there-
fore established that Milliken was not limited to the issue of school de-
segregation, but was a decision with implications for the federal judicial
power in general.
54. See note 52 supra.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (Supp. IV 1974).
56. One estimate was that nearly ninety-one percent of the total contractual
payments for all federal housing programs were made under the section 8 program
in 1976. 96 S. Ct. at 1549 n.19.
57. As HUD admitted to the Court, "explicit" local approval is no longer a
prerequisite for HUD action in a given locality. Id. at 1549.
58. Id. at 1550. See note 77 infra.
59. Id.
60. The Supreme Court, in remanding the case back to the district court,
explicitly noted that a metropolitan remedy was not necessarily required in this
case. The Court only decided that such relief could be granted. Id. at 1550.
61. For a fuller description and analysis of the unresolved issues in Milliken see
The Supreme Court - 1973 Term, supra note 30, at 69-71.
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Equally important, Hills clarifies and affirms the Milliken test for the
permissibility of interdistrict relief. Prior to granting multidistrict relief,
federal district courts must consider two separate criteria. First, they must
examine the nature of the constitutional violation. If the violation was
committed by more than one governmental unit or if a violation by a single
unit exerts an interdistrict effect, then a multidistrict remedy is permissible.
If the violation does not fit either of these categories, the trial court, while
not foreclosed from granting interdistrict relief, must satisfy Hills' second
criterion - that such relief does not interfere with the relevant govern-
mental units. 62
Hills provides a significant clarification of the Supreme Court's think-
ing on the scope of federal equity power. Since the first desegregation
decision in Brown v. Board of Education," the Court has "consistently
relied on its equity powers to fashion relief once a constitutional violation
has been shown."'64 Given the increasing complexity of judicial involve-
ment, however, it was likely that the Court might eventually decide that
there should be limits on the reach of equitable remedies designed to
eradicate segregation. The Court's desire to narrow the scope of its
equitable decrees can be explained by reference to the criteria equity courts
normally use as the framework for designing remedial decrees in general.
In addition to their concern for justice and morality, equity courts
typically examine whether the contemplated remedies can be administered
in a practical fashion.65 Courts may decide that it is "better to live with
[a] particular injustice than it is to live with general bad management." 66
While managerial practicality was not explicitly discussed in Hills, the
Court nevertheless appears to have formulated a test that will effectively
screen out those remedies, of all types and in any context, that might
result in general bad management. Where the violation is interdistrict in
scope or effect, the magnitude of the wrong itself justifies whatever prob-
lems the judiciary might encounter in enforcing interdistrict relief. Where
the violation occurs in the more limited, intradistrict context, a remedy
that involves interference with unimplicated governmental units simply
may not be worth the cost of judicial supervision and administration. 67
62. The Court did not state whether the existence of such interference must be
proven. The opinion provided no guidance for the situation in which a party argues
that interference is either potential or probable.
63. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ; 349 U.S. 294 (1955). Dell'ario, Remedies For School
Segregation: A Limit on the Equity Power of the Federal Courts?, 2 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 113 (1975).
64. Dell'ario, supra note 63, at 115.
65. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIEs 4-5 (1973).
66. Id. at 56.
67. The question remains whether Justice Stewart's decision reflects a particular
concern for judicial administration. The interrelationship between the Court's rulings
and the effective administration of the federal judicial system is a concern more
frequently expressed by Chief Justice Burger. Cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Fed. Bur. of Narc., 403 U.S. 388, 415-18 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(In a discussion of the exclusion of unconstitutionally seized evidence, the Chief Justice
688 [VOL. 36
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The Hills decision may also reflect a growing inclination to protect
the sovereignty of state and local government. In National League of Cities
v. Usery,68 decided during the same term as Hills, the Court overturned a
1974 Congressional amendment that extended the coverage of the mini-
mum wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of
193869 to nearly every class of state and municipal employees. In language
strikingly similar to that found in Hills, 70 the Court emphasized that the
minimum wage statute threatened to "substantially restructure traditional
ways in which ... local governments have arranged their affairs."171 Re-
affirming the concept that "there are limits upon the power of Congress to
override state sovereignty, '7 2 the Court ruled that even under the broad
grant of power in the commerce clause of the Constitution, federal legisla-
tion could not operate "to directly displace the States' freedom to structure
integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions. '73 In
shielding state and local governments against intrusion by the federal
judicial and legislative branches, Hills and National League of Cities mani-
fest a renewed concern for the principles of federalism that seek to limit
the exercise of the federal power.74
After Hills, the outcome of future civil rights litigation should be far
more predictable. The Court has a philosophy and a test by which to
implement it. On the other hand, a close analysis of Hills reveals that
questions remain.75  One unresolved issue involves the factors to be
noted that little clear data exists to prove this judicial doctrine meets its stated
objective - the deterrence of illegal conduct by law enforcement officers.)
68. 96 S. Ct 2465 (1976).
69. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1970 & Supp. V 1976).
70. For example, the Court in Hills noted that the judicial remedy in Milliken
was impermissible "because it contemplated a judicial decree restructuring the opera-
tion of local government entities that were not implicated in any constitutional
violation." 96 S. Ct. at 1545.
71. 96 S. Ct at 2473.
72. Id. at 2469.
73. Id. at 2474.
74. Federalism has always been concerned with the exercise of the federal judicial
power in a manner that interferes with state governments. See note 16 supra. See also
Rizzo v. Goode, 96 S. Ct. 598, 607-08 (1976).
75. One particularly tantalizing issue involves the significance of Justice Stewart's
authorship of Hills in relation to certain language used in his Milliken concurrence.
In his concurrence, Justice Stewart noted that metropolitan relief "might well be
appropriate" if it were shown that state officials had fostered school segregation by
"purposeful racially discriminatory use of state housing or zoning laws." Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 755 (1974) (Stewart, J., concurring).
In Hills, no state discrimination in housing or zoning laws was alleged.
However, for all practical purposes, such a charge was made against HUD, a federal
agency. If, under Stewart's view, actions by state officials affecting the racial composi-
tion of the housing market can result in remedial activity in a school system, it is
not illogical to argue that the same result should ensue when federal officials are
involved. In either instance, the underlying theory is the same - where a govern-
mental policy, even in a totally unconnected sphere of activity, promotes school segre-
gation, remedial activity affecting the schools becomes justified. Indeed, this very
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considered by a trial court that contemplates the application of an inter-
district remedy to an intradistrict violation. The extent to which unin-
volved governmental entities can be coerced before there is "impermissible
interference" is not clear. The Court determined with impeccable logic
in Hills that there would be no coercion of the suburban governments
solution has been suggested by several commentators. See Kushner and Werner,
supra note 30, at 216. See also Beer, The Nature of the Violation and the Scope of
the Remedy: An Analysis of Milliken v. Bradley in Terms of the Evolution of the
Theory of the Violation, 21 WAYNE L. REv. 902 (1975); West, Another View of the
Bradley Violation: Would A Different Evolution Have Changed The Outcome?, 21
WAYNE L. REv. 917 (1975). Thus if the plaintiff in Hills had proved either an inter-
district violation or effect on the part of HUD, then, at least in Justice Stewart's
view, the decree designed to remedy housing violations might involve the school
system.
Several recent cases have followed Justice Stewart's line of reasoning. In
Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del. 1975), the district court justified
ordering the submission of a metropolitan remedy for school segregation in part
on the basis of involvement by governmental authorities in fostering segregated
housing. This decision was affirmed without discussion by the Supreme Court,
Buchanan v. Evans, 96 S. Ct. 381 (1976), aff'g mem., 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del.
1975). Since the Court provided no written opinion in Evans, the issue posed by
Justice Stewart in Milliken and Hills appeared to remain open. However, the Supreme
Court's most recent action in this area casts substantial doubt on such a conclusion.
In United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 541 F2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1976),
vacated sub nom. Metropolitan School Dists. v. Buckley, 45 U.S.L.W. 3500 (U.S.
Jan. 25, 1977), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in a post-Hills
ruling, affirmed a lower court order granting a limited interdistrict remedy to relieve
racial segregation in the Indianapolis public school system. The district court had
ordered the busing of children in grades one through nine from the city school district
to eight outlying suburban school systems after finding that both the state and local
suburban governments had violated the Constitution - the former by failing to
reestablish Indianapolis' school district lines at the time the municipal government of
Indianapolis was replaced by a consolidated countywide government, and the latter by
their confinement of all public housing to the City of Indianapolis. The appellate court,
specifically referring to Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Milliken, partially
justified its affirmance on the ground that "[t] he record... clearly shows a 'purposeful,
racially discriminatory use of state housing."' Id. at 1223. Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court's decision to vacate this judgment offers minimal guidance regarding limitations
on a federal court's equitable power to grant such relief.
In any event, several factors argue against the remedial approach proposed by
Justice Stewart. First, the reach of such a decree might well violate the Milliken "na-
ture of the violation/scope of the remedy" test that other members of the Court have
stressed. Second, the Court might encounter some difficulty in reconciling Justice
Stewart's approach with San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973). In that case, Justice Powell, writing for the majority, held Texas' use of
local property taxes as a method of school financing did not violate the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. In reaching this conclusion Justice Powell
emphasized that educational policy is one "area in which this Court's lack of specialized
knowledge and experience counsels against premature interference with the informed
judgments made at the state and local level." Id. at 42. The Court concluded that
education was, therefore, a matter best left to the "legislative processes of the various
states." Id. at 58. The deference to state educational policies shown by the Court in
San Antonio might suggest a reluctance to remedy constitutional housing practices by
policy changes in local school districts.
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because a proper decree would merely force HUD to use its discretionary
powers in the manner anticipated by Congress. A future litigant who
examines this decision will find a trial court only has the power to direct a
federal agency to conduct its affairs in a constitutional manner. More pre-
cise illumination of the boundaries of the federal equity power must await
further decisions by the Supreme Court.
One commentator, analyzing the Milliken decision, remarked that "the
Court seems silently to decide that the social and political costs of metro-
politan relief justify incurring the risk of allowing some segregative effects
to go unremedied. ' 76 This observation seems sound. The Court may have
concluded that the disruptive effects flowing from judicial attempts to
restructure the racial composition of America's educational system render
further judicial interference inadvisable, and that the impetus for further
desegregation must come from the legislative branch. Nevertheless, the
outcome in Hills suggests that judicial modification of residential housing
patterns may promote integration in a variety of circumstances without tur-
moil. Perhaps school desegregation may be better achieved by changing
the racial distribution within America's unnaturally split urban-suburban
housing structure. Unfortunately, the validity of this analysis cannot be
ascertained solely on the basis of Hills. If this decision shifts the focus
of civil rights litigation away from schools and into housing, however, cases
will surely appear in which the Court can decide the extent of judicial
involvement in the eradication of what is possibly the central problem
in American race relations - segregated housing patterns.77
76. The Supreme Court - 1973 Term, supra note 30, at 69.
77. The Supreme Court recently encountered the problem of segregated housing
patterns in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Dev. Corp., 45 U.S.L.W.
4073 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1976). The Court overturned a Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
decision, 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975), which had declared a municipality's refusal
to grant a zoning change that would permit construction of a low to moderate income
housing development to be a violation of the equal protection clause because the
denial produced "racially discriminatory effects." 517 F.2d at 415. Writing for the
majority, Justice Powell observed that "discriminatory effects" were not enough;
actual "[p]roof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a
violation of the equal protection clause." 45 U.S.L.W. at 4077. Indeed, even if it
were proven that a zoning decision was partially motivated by a "discriminatory
purpose," this improper motivation would not necessarily produce a constitutional
violation. Instead, such a showing would merely shift "to the Village the burden
of establishing that the same decision would have resulted even had the impermissible
purpose not been considered." Id. at 4078 n.21.
The Arlington Heights decision may present a substantial obstacle to those
parties seeking to use the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 to
increase the supply of public housing in the suburbs. Because the Act allows a
locality to insist that HUD projects conform to local zoning and land-use ordinances,
restrictive zoning can frustrate efforts to integrate the suburbs. Nevertheless, advo-
cates of greater availability of suburban public housing may still be able to
attack restrictive zoning practices in state courts. See Southern Burlington County
N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975) (A
municipality must employ its land-use regulations so as to provide opportunities for
housing for all classes of people, including those with low and moderate incomes.).
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LABOR LAW - TITLE VII REMEDIES - CONSTRUCTIVE SENIORITY
AS AN APPROPRIATE REMEDY FOR PERSONS DISCRIMINATED AGAINST
IN HIRING - Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.'
In Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co. the Supreme Court addressed
the question whether constructive seniority2 may be awarded to those
persons who have been discriminatorily denied employment in violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.3 Harold Franks brought
a class action against his former employer, Bowman Transportation Com-
pany, and against his unions, alleging racially discriminatory practices in
violation of Title VII.4 The class was ultimately divided into four smaller
classes. Classes 1 and 2 were not relevant to the Supreme Court decision.5
The third class included individuals who had applied for over the road
(OTR) positions and had been discriminatorily denied employment, and
the fourth class included employees who had been discriminatorily denied
promotions to higher paying OTR truck driving positions. The district
court, finding that Bowman had engaged in a pattern of discriminatory
practices, enjoined the company from continuing such practices. Further,
it ordered Bowman to give employees who had been discriminatorily
denied transfers to OTR positions priority in transfer to such positions
and to give employees who had been discriminatorily denied employment
as OTR drivers priority in hiring for such positions.6 The district court
did not, however, provide a remedy for the loss of departmental seniority
suffered by transferees, and declined to award back pay or seniority relief
to any of the unnamed class members.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the
district court erred in refusing to award back pay to unnamed class mem-
1. 96 S. Ct. 1251 (1976).
2. Constructive seniority, also referred to as retroactive or fictional seniority,
entitles a discriminatee to be treated as though he had actually worked for the em-
ployer from the time of the initial discrimination.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970) (Supp. V, 1975).
4. Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 5 F.E.P. 421 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
5. Class 1 was composed of black employees who had been restricted to the Tire
Shop by a departmental seniority system. By restricting bidding on job vacancies to
workers within the department where the vacancy occurred, the departmental seniority
system prevented blacks from transferring into all white departments. Class 2 was
composed of black employees in the Tire Shop who had been discouraged by the
company from transferring into the Tractor and Trailer Shops even though they
were technically entitled to bid on jobs available there. Id. at 430.
6. The district court ordered the company to allow members of class 1 to com-
pete for jobs using company seniority, (i.e. that time actually spent working for Bow-
man prior to August 15, 1968, the date when Bowman began hiring black employees
outside the Tire Shop, plus any departmental seniority accumulated thereafter). It
also ordered the company to notify members of class 2 of their right to transfer to
the Tractor and Trailer Shop with full departmental seniority after transfer. 495
F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1974).
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bers and that employees transferring to OTR positions should retain
company seniority.7  The court affirmed the district court's denial of
seniority relief to those persons who had been discriminatorily refused
employment on the ground that section 703(h) of Title VII bars this
type of remedy.8  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether a grant of constructive seniority was a permissible and appro-
priate remedy under Title VII.9 In an opinion by Justice Brennan, the
Court held that a grant of seniority was not only permissible and appro-
priate, but that there was a presumption in favor of such relief.
In considering the appropriateness of constructive seniority, the Court
concentrated on "competitive-type" seniority rather than "benefit-type
seniority." Competitive seniority uses an employee's length of service
to determine his relative right to economic advantages that cannot be pro-
vided equally to all employees. These advantages include more protection
from layoff than that afforded junior employees, priority in being recalled
from layoff, and the right to receive promotion or transfer. Benefit
seniority uses an employee's length of service to determine his entitlement
to economic fringe benefits. These benefits include paid vacation, pension,
and insurance coverage. 10 There is little if any dispute as to the propriety
of awarding benefit-type seniority." The implication of the rights of
other employees inherent in a grant of constructive competitive seniority,
however, has caused the courts to question the propriety of such a grant.
Prior to Franks, courts had reached conflicting decisions on the avail-
ability of seniority relief. In Local 189, Papermakers v. United States,12
the court ruled that an award of constructive seniority was not available to
new employees who had been victims of hiring discrimination, because
this remedy would require the employer to grant preferential treatment
7. The court of appeals held that the relief ordered for class 1 was insufficient
because the discriminatees would still be at a disadvantage in competing with other
workers. It therefore held that for a reasonable time after the entry of the decree,
members of class 1 would be permitted to use full company seniority in competing for
jobs. Id. at 416-17.
8. § 703(h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970), provides in part:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this subchapter, it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of
compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant
to a bona fide seniority or merit system ....
9. 96 S. Ct. 1251 (1976). The mootness question raised by respondent Bowman
was considered briefly by the Court. Bowman argued that because the sole named
representative of hiring discriminatees (class 3) had been discharged for cause and
would not be eligible for hiring relief, the issue before the Court was moot. The Court
responded that the mootness question was answered by determining whether a "live
controversy" was still before the Court and determined that a live controversy existed
because the interests of the unnamed class members were still at issue. Id. at 1258--60.
10. See SLICHTER, HEALY & LIVERNASH, THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIvE BARGAINING
ON MANAGEMENT 104-15 (1960).
11. 96 S. Ct. at 1268 n.33; 96 S. Ct. at 1278 n.12 (Powell, J., dissenting).
12. 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
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in violation of section 703(j) of Title VII. 1 3 In Meadows v. Ford Motor
Co.,14 the court, although recognizing that grants of constructive seniority
involve conflicting interests of employees and discriminatees, held that
such relief was available at the discretion of the district court.15 The court
in Jurinko v. Edwin L. Wiegand Co.' 6 awarded retroactive seniority on
the ground that it was the only remedy that could eradicate the present
effects of the past discrimination.
The Supreme Court in Franks initially reviewed the appellate court's
ruling that retroactive seniority relief was barred by section 703(h) of
Title VII.17 It noted that petitioners did not seek modification or elimina-
tion of the existing seniority system but rather an award of seniority that
would place them in the position they would have occupied but for the
illegal discrimination. The Court found no indication in the legislative
materials that section 703(h) was "intended to modify or restrict relief...
once an illegal discriminatory practice occurring after the effective date
of the Act is proved."' 8 Consequently, it concluded that the Court of
Appeals erred in reading that section as a bar to seniority relief.
After determining that seniority relief was available, the Court focused
on the circumstances in which such a remedy would be appropriate under
the remedial section of Title VII, section 706(g). 19 The Court relied
substantially on its decision in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody.20 Re-
iterating the position articulated in Albemarle, the Court stated that
13. § 703(j) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970), provides in part:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any em-
ployer ... to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because
of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group ....
14. 510 F2d 939 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.LW. 3670 (U.S. April
25, 1975) (action by a woman discriminated against by her company's use of a weight
requirement).
15. The court suggested several factors to be considered by the district court:
[A] grant of retroactive seniority would not depend solely upon the existence of a
record sufficient to justify back pay . . . . The court would, in dealing with job
seniority, need also to consider the interests of the workers who might be dis-
placed as well as the interests of the employer in retaining an experienced
work force.
510 F.2d at 949.
16. 477 F.2d 1038 (3d Cir.), vacated, 414 U.S. 970 (1973), reinstated, 497 F.2d
403 (3d Cir. 1974).
17. The pertinent part of section 703(h) is set out at note 8 supra.
18. 96 S. Ct. at 1263. The Court noted that its decision was in accord with the
apparently unanimous view of the commentators. Id.
19. Section 706(g) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970), provides in part:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is
intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the com-
plaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful em-
ployment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which
may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or
without back pay ... or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.
20. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
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Title VII has twin objectives: "to prohibit all practices in whatever form
which create inequality in employment opportunity due to discrimination
on the basis of race, religion, sex, or national origin" and "'to make
persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment
discrimination.' ",21 Recognizing the increasing importance of competi-
tive seniority to workers in today's economy,2 2 the Court found that
seniority relief was necessary to further effectuate the "make-whole"
objective of the Act. A discriminatee who was denied but has since secured
employment will, in the absence of seniority relief, "never obtain his
rightful place in the hierarchy of seniority . . . [but] will perpetually
remain subordinate to persons who, but for the illegal discrimination,
would have been in respect to entitlement to these benefits his inferiors. '23
The Court noted that Congress, in section 7 06(g), vested broad equitable
discretion in the federal courts to fashion whatever remedies would best
effectuate the purposes of the Act. Nonetheless, the Court rejected
Bowman's contention that the denial of seniority relief was totally within
the equitable discretion of the district court. In rejecting this contention,
the Court again relied on its decision in Albemarle and held that, as with
back pay, "the denial of seniority relief to victims of illegal racial dis-
crimination in hiring is permissible 'only for reasons which, if applied
generally, would not frustrate the central statutory purposes of eradicating
discrimination throughout the economy and making persons whole for
injuries suffered through past discrimination.' 24 The practical effect of
this holding is that a district court must articulate its reasons for denying
seniority relief.2 5 This requirement, both in the context of back pay and
seniority, promotes consistency in the awarding of Title VII relief.2 6
In addition to Albemarle, the Court also relied on cases decided
under the remedial section of the National Labor Relations Act (N.L.R.A.),
section 10(c),27 as support for the conclusion that a grant of retroactive
21. 96 S. Ct. at 1263-64.
22. Competitive seniority is especially important in a time of economic decline
because it protects a worker from layoffs caused by curtailed production. If a worker
is laid off, seniority can determine how soon he is called back. Seniority can also
directly affect how much a worker makes because it can determine how quickly he
advances. D. Stacy, Title VII Seniority Remedies in a Time of Economic Downturn,
28 VAND. L. REv. 487, 488-92 (1975).
23. 96 S. Ct. at 1266.
24. Id. at 1267, quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975).
25. 96 S. Ct. at 1269.
26. Id. at 1267.
27. Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970),
provides in part:
If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the
opinion that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in
any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and
shall issue and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person
to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative
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seniority is appropriate under section 706(g).211 These cases disclose
that the National Labor Relations Board regularly awards constructive
seniority to victims of discrimination.29 Because section 10(c) of the
NLRA served as a model for section 706(g) of Title VII,3 0 the Court
was justified in relying on these board decisions and in finding that the
power of courts to fashion affirmative remedies at least equals that of
the Board.
Having determined that denial of seniority relief would perpetuate
the effects of past discrimination, the Court refused to distinguish between
hiring discriminatees and transfer discriminatees in regard to entitlement
to seniority relief. Without such relief members of either class would be
unfairly subordinated in the seniority system. Therefore, the Court con-
cluded that both groups should be awarded constructive seniority."'
There are, however, certain distinctions that may be drawn between
the two classes. There is a significant distinction in size. The class of
employee discriminatees is sufficiently defined and limited that the effect of
awards of constructive seniority would not be unduly speculative. The
class of hiring discriminatees, however, could conceivably be so large that
across-the-board awards of constructive seniority would be inequitable. It
may also be argued that since hiring discriminatees have no actual experi-
ence, an award of seniority may place inexperienced employees in positions
they are unequipped to handle82 whereas employee discriminatees will
have some work experience.33 The crucial distinction relates to the psycho-
logical impact on incumbent workers of a grant of constructive seniority;
present employees are more likely to resent being passed over in the
promotion process for a person who has never worked for the company
action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will
effectuate the policies of this subchapter ....
28. The pertinent part of section 706(g) is set out at note 19 supra.
29. In re Phelps Dodge Corp., 19 N.L.R.B. 547 (1940), modified on other grounds,
113 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1940), modified on other grounds, 313 U.S. 117 (1941) (ordering
reinstatement without "prejudice to their seniority" of those discriminated against
because of union activities) ; In re Nevada Consolidated Copper Corp., 26 N.L.R.B.
1182 (1940), enforcement denied, 122 F.2d 587 (10th Cir. 1941), enforced, 316 U.S. 105
(1942) (awarding retroactive seniority to persons discriminatorily refused employ-
ment because of union affiliations).
30. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419 (1975).
31. 96 S. Ct. at 1266.
32. It has been proposed that the problem of workers attaining positions they are
unable to handle can be solved by the use of a residency requirement whereby an
employee would have to work for a specified period of time in each job before being
promoted to the next level. Gould, Employment Security, Seniority and Race: The
Role of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 How. L.J. 1, 42-49 (1967).
33. It has been suggested that a seniority system functions mainly as a limitation
on the employer's power over the employee, and provides an objective criterion that
a union can use in arbitrating disputes among its members. Cooper & Sobol, Seniority
and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A General Approach to Objective
Criteria of Hirin and Promotion, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1598, 1604-07 (1969).
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than for a person who has worked for the company longer than they have.
The Court did not discuss any of these distinctions.
The possible adverse effect upon the rights and expectations of inno-
cent employees presents the most difficult issue in a grant of constructive
seniority. Rejecting the argument that such relief was inappropriate
because it adversely affected those rights and expectations, the Court
reasoned that sharing the burden of past discrimination is necessary and
"is entirely consistent with any fair characterization of equity jurisdic-
tion." 34 The Court relied on a line of cases holding that the rights and
expectations of employees under a seniority system were not indefeasibly
vested, but rather were subject to statutory modification.35
The reasoning of the majority was challenged in a dissent authored
by Justice Powell and joined in by Justice Rehnquist. Endorsing the
Sixth Circuit's response to the retroactive seniority issue,36 the dissent
contended that since the rights of innocent employees presented a counter-
vrailing consideration, the district court should be free to weigh the equities
of each case to determine if seniority relief is appropriate. The dissent
noted that by creating a presumption in favor of seniority relief, the Court
was depriving the district courts of the equitable discretion vested in them
by section 706(g). The language of section 706 (g) providing that the
court can order "any other equitable relief" it deems appropriate3 7 indi-
cates that Congress did not intend the district courts to "disregard normal
equitable considerations. s3 8 The dissent distinguished the presumption in
favor of back pay from the presumption in favor of seniority in that the
former advances both objectives of Title VII, but the latter, rather than
34. 96 S. Ct. at 1270.
35. These cases all involved the issue whether an employee may be granted
seniority credit for time spent in the service. Tilton v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 376 U.S.
169 (1964); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953); Fishgold v. Sullivan
Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275 (1946).
36. 96 S. Ct. at 1279:
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, recently faced with the issue of
retroactive seniority for victims of hiring discrimination, showed a fine apprecia-
tion of the distinction discussed above. Meadows v. Ford Motor Co., 510 F.2d
939 (1975), cert. pending, No. 74-1349. That court began with the recognition
that retroactive competitive-type seniority presents "greater problems" than a
grant of back pay because the burden falls upon innocent incumbents rather than
the wrongdoing employer. Id. at 949. The court further recognized that Title
VII contains no prohibition against such relief. Then, noting that "the remedy
for the wrong of discriminatory refusal to hire lies in the first instance with the
District Judge," . . . . The Sixth Circuit suggested that the District Court seek
enlightenment on the question involved in the particular fact situation, and that
it should allow intervention by representatives of the incumbents who stood to
be disadvantaged.
37. The pertinent part of section 706(g) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)
(1970), is set out at note 19 supra.
38. 96 S. Ct. at 1274.
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furthering the objective of deterring future wrongdoing, injures only inno-
cent employees.
The dissent apparently overlooked the fact that the employees in
Franks were not wholly innocent of wrongdoing.8 9 It also ignored the
employer's interest in maintaining good employee relations. It is likely that
those employees who have had their expectations frustrated will direct
some of their frustration toward their employer. Additionally, the employer
has a strong interest in "sheltering a company from litigation and preserving
its rights to manage as it, not the government, deems best."'40 Therefore,
even a grant of constructive seniority arguably furthers the objective of
deterrence.
The dissent also contested the majority's reliance on section 10(c)
of the NLRA, 41 insisting that such reliance was inconsistent with the
majority's holding. The fallacy in the Court's reliance on Board precedent,
according to the dissent, was that district courts under Title VII stand in
place of the Board under the NLRA. Both the Board and the district
courts were granted similar broad discretion in determining appropriate
remedies for violations, yet a presumption in favor of seniority relief
denies district courts the broad discretion which the Board exercises subject
to limited review.42 The dissent failed to note, however, that limiting the
courts' discretion in areas where the Board has not been limited may be
justified by the fact that the Board has expertise in handling hiring
discrimination cases and the courts do not.
The only discussion of a possible alternative to seniority relief was
presented in a brief dissent by Chief Justice Burger. He suggested that
a form of front pay whereby the discriminatee is given a monetary award
to compensate for the lost competitive-type seniority would be a more
equitable remedy. He stressed that such an award would further the twin
objectives of Title VII without injuring innocent employees. Front pay,
however, is not an adequate substitute for seniority relief. A monetary
award cannot compensate for the loss of the non-pecuniary benefits of
seniority. Even with such an award, a discriminatee will suffer the
humiliation of being subordinated in the line of progression. Additionally,
problems of administration are likely to arise, for it is unclear how long
a discriminatee would be entitled to compensation for loss of seniority.
39. The court of appeals in Franks stated:
The apparent source of the resistance to change in this department [OTR at
Bowman] was the unwillingess of the white drivers to "ride double" with blacks
to train them for the job or to share bunk and shower facilities with them
on the road.
495 F.2d at 411.
40. R. Sibbernsen, A Review of Job and Seniority Structures in Light of EEO
Liability, 26 LAB. L.J. 666, 674 (1975).
41. The pertinent part of section 10(c) is set out at note 27 supra.
42. NLRB v. Priced-Less Discount Foods, Inc., 405 F.2d 67, 69 (6th Cir. 1968)
(the scope of review of an NLRB decision is limited to determining whether the action
of the board was an abuse of discretion).
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An employer could conceivably be required to continue front pay payments
indefinitely. Although front pay is not a suitable alternative to seniority
relief, it may be an appropriate supplement to provide additional make-whole
relief.48
The Franks decision raised several issues that the Court did not
address. The Court noted that an award of seniority relief would not be
requisite in all cases, but it did not specify the circumstances in which it
would be appropriate to deny such relief. It is likely that the doctrine of
business necessity will figure in this analysis. 44 Under the business necessity
doctrine, a practice that has an adverse effect on minorities will not be
held illegal if "there exists an overriding legitimate business purpose such
that the practice is necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the
business. ' 45 Accordingly, if a discriminatee does not possess the requisite
skills for a certain position, it would not be necessary to award him con-
structive seniority that would make him eligible for the position. There-
fore, if a discriminatee does not type, a court would be justified in denying
him seniority that would qualify him for a position as a secretary. It should
be noted, however, that under the doctrine of business necessity, it is
difficult for the employer to sustain his burden of proof.48
Defenses presently recognized in the area of back pay could also
be applicable to the constructive seniority issue. For example, failure of
the plaintiff to mitigate his losses has been considered an affirmative de-
43. Cross v. Board of Education, 395 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Ark. 1975); White v.
Carolina Paperboard Co., 10 E.P.D. 10,470 (W.D.N.C. 1975).
In these cases front pay operated to extend back pay until the discriminatee
had attained his rightful place. Front pay compensated the discriminatee for losses
suffered during the period between the time when the court ordered the award of
back pay and the time when the employer could offer him a suitable position. Front
pay thus contributes to the objective of making the discriminatee whole by providing
a suitable remedy for the loss sustained during the period of time for which the dis-
criminatee has traditionally not been compensated. Also, if the award is made by
paying the victim the salary he would have received in his rightful place, it has the
advantage of encouraging the employer to expeditiously place the discriminatee in his
rightful place. It appears, therefore, that front pay in conjunction with back pay and
retroactive seniority would provide an effective make-whole remedy. See Note, Front
Pay - Prophylactic Relief Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 VAND.
L. REv. 211 (1976).
44. The doctrine of business necessity has been asserted as a defense to charges
that various practices adversely affect minorities. See Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (attempt to justify testing requirements as job related) ;
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971) (attempt to justify a
departmental seniority system) ; Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245
(10th Cir. 1970) (attempt to justify a no transfer policy between city drivers and
OTR drivers).
45. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1971).
46. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See also Note, Of
Storks and Foxes - Employment Testing and Backpay, 34 MD. L. Rizv. 383, 385-
92 (1974).
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fense to a claim for back pay.47 A similar defense in the context of Franks
would provide that if an employer can prove that a discriminatee actually
accepted employment elsewhere and attained seniority status equivalent to
that which he would have enjoyed in the defendant's employ, an award of
constructive seniority would not be required. Presently, however, the
circumstances in which seniority relief may be denied are not clear.
The Court implied that its decision was influenced by the fact that,
in this particular case, only a few discriminatees actually sought hiring
relief.48 This implication raises questions of the effect of Franks on a large
class action in which many people seek hiring relief. Large numbers of
constructive seniority awards could cause substantial harm to a business
if many employees are promoted to positions that they are incapable of per-
forming. 49 This is more a theoretical than practical problem, however, in
that "bumping" incumbent employees to create positions for discriminatees
is prohibited, 50 and therefore rather than being hired en masse, discrimi-
natees would be hired only as positions became available in the course of
business. The possibility that the employer would be inundated with inex-
perienced workers is thus greatly reduced. Additionally, the defense of busi-
ness necessity would probably preclude a discriminatee from obtaining a
position for which he did not have the requisite skills. In light of these
considerations, class size does not apear to be an important factor in a
grant of seniority.
The Court in Franks also failed to address the question whether an
award of constructive seniority constitutes preferential treatment in viola-
tion of section 703(j) of Title VII.51 In United States v. Local 189,
Papermakers,52 the Fifth Circuit held that because there would be no
way of knowing whether hiring discriminatees, after being hired, would
have continued to work for the same employer, the creation of "fictional"
seniority for newly-hired blacks would constitute preferential rather than
remedial treatment. The court cited section 703(j) as a manifestation of
congressional sentiment against such preferential treatment based on race.
A possible response to the preferential treatment argument is suggested
by a line of cases holding that section 703(j) in no way limits a court's
47. English v. Seaboard Coastline R.R. Co., 12 F.E.P. 90, 93 (S.D. Ga. 1975):
Any assertion that a claimant failed to mitigate damages, or was not qualified
for the position or positions which are part of the claim's basis, or was not in-
terested in or willing to accept such position, or for any other reason was not
financially injured by the defendant's discriminatory practices, shall be presented
as an affirmative defense.
48. 96 S. Ct. at 1270 n.36.
49. See note 32 supra.
50. Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1976).
51. The pertinent part of section 703 (j) is set out at note 13 supra.
52. Local 189, Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 995 (5th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970) (company maintained segregated lines of progression
limiting promotion to persons in the job slot below, thus preventing transfer between
lines; upon merging of the lines, those in the black line of progression had to start
from the lowest slot in the white line thus "sacrificing seniority benefits").
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ability to order affirmative relief. In United States v. Local 38, I.B.E.W.53
the court held that when section 703(j) is read in the context of the broad
equitable powers granted by section 703(g), it cannot be construed as a
limitation of those powers, for to do so "would allow complete nullification
of the stated purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." 5 4 Following this
reasoning, the court in United States v. Local 86, Ironworkers5 5 rejected
an argument that section 703(j) barred the court from ordering a union
practicing discrimination to provide job referrals and training to dis-
criminatees. These courts, however, were considering traditional types of
affirmative relief.56 Seniority relief arguably goes beyond these traditional
remedies by requiring an employer to give a discriminatee preference for
competitive benefits over someone who has actually worked for the com-
pany. The question whether constructive seniority constitutes preferential
treatment is not clearly settled.
A recent case relying on Franks provides additional insight into the
significance of the decision. McAleer v. A.T.&T. 7 involved an action
brought by a male employee who had been pased over for promotion so
that a female employee with less seniority could be promoted pursuant to
a consent decree resulting from earlier Title VII litigation. The court,
relying on Franks, found that the plaintiff was not entitled to promotion
since "to award such relief might well perpetuate and prolong the effects of
discrimination the Philadelphia Consent Decree was designed to elimi-
nate."5 However, the court, again relying on Franks,5 9 concluded that
the burden of past discrimination must be borne by A.T.&T. and that the
plaintiff was entitled to compensation for the lost promotion.6° McAleer is
illustrative of reverse discrimination issues that may result from an award
of constructive seniority.
Franks clearly establishes that constructive seniority is available and
appropriate as a remedy for discrimination in hiring. Although this decision
may diminish the rights of one group in order to advance those of a dis-
advantaged group, it is only through such a sharing of the burden of past
discrimination that the make-whole objective of Title VII can be achieved.
53. 428 F2d 144 (6th Cir. 1970).
54. Id. at 149-50.
55. 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1971).
56. The court in I.B.E.W. considered general affirmative relief not including
constructive seniority. The court in Ironworkers considered injunctive relief ordering
the admission of blacks into a union.
57. 12 E.P.D. 1 10,994 (D.D.C. 1976).
58. Id. at 4669. The court rejected the argument that the consent decree pro-
tected A. T. & T. from suit. Rather, it held that a consent decree resulting from a de-
fendant's wrongful actions would not protect a defendant from litigation. Id.
59. Id. "[C]ourts should attempt to protect innocent employees by placing this
burden [of eradicating discrimination] on the wrongdoing employer whenever possible."
60. Pursuant to an out of court settlement, the McAleer decision has been vacated
in respect to the plaintiff's right to damages. Conversation with Mr. Robert W.
Jeffrey, Counsel for the defendant, November 11, 1976.
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